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SYSTEMIC CHANGE AND
LOCAL REFORM: TWO VIEWS OF THE
FUTURE OF CANADIAN EVIDENCE LAW
By SIMON CHESTER*
I
leremy Bentham would have had the measure of this symposium. As
we speak of change and the alternative modalities of change in the law of
evidence, we join in a long standing debate, inaugurated by Bentham a hun-
dred and fifty years ago. The central themes of this symposium were clear in
Bentham's work. When we bewail arid over-conceptualism and propose de-
mystification of the law, we follow Bentham's analysis: "to keep the whole
subject involved for ever in confusion, the very thickest confusion that can
be manufactured, has been the line of policy so diligently and successfully
pursued by the fraternity of lawyers throughout the whole field of law."1
When we seek to substitute a rational system of proof by reducing outdated
exclusionary rules, admitting all evidence and then assessing its probative
value, for inquiries into out-moded psychology and dubious probabilities,
Bentham's thinking precedes us. 2
© Copyright, 1978, Simon Chester.
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'Jeremy Bentham, "An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence," in The
Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. J. Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843). Vol. VI at
144; H.L.A. Hart, Bentham and the Demystification of the Law (1973), 36 M.L.R.2.
2 Bentham, "Rationale of Judicial Evidence," id., Vol. VII at 72.
OSGOODE HALL
LAW JOURNAL
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Bentham, in many ways the most radical of reformers, was the great
advocate of codification and a proclaimed skeptic towards the traditional
merits of the common law.3 He insisted on placing even the most revered
tenets of the law under critical scrutiny.4 His intelligent analysis of the future
development of the law's substance, method, procedure, and logic, and his
definition of the appropriate place of conscious law reform efforts in this
development, reminds us that the following articles, whether dealing with
subjects such as the desirability of codification or alternative approaches to
hearsay, take implicit positions on the central problem facing reformers: the
rationality of the law and its capacity to adapt and develop.
I want to stress that when discussing the merits, or imperfections, of the
Report on Evidence5 of the Law Reform Commission of Canada or the
Ontario Law Reform Commission's Report on the Law of Evidence,0 we are
also addressing much broader issues. While those who evaluate the approach
of each Commission to various topics may have preferences between the two,
rarely can one come to any conclusive judgments, given the fact that the
two reports are characterized by such different intentions and informing
philosophies. They are fundamentally not comparable. The two reports are
directed at effecting practical change, rather than demonstrating, through
purely abstract illustrations, the theoretical dilemmas of law reform. Yet the
choices made between reform measures turn on preferences and attitudes
that derive from moral and political values as much as they spring from ex-
perience of the technical intricacies of the trial. They also exhibit very differ-
ent responses to questions that are emerging in a much wider debate con-
cerning the future development of law in Canada and the appropriate func-
tion of a law reform agency in that process.
Indeed the only proposition that commands general acceptance in this
symposium is that many features of our law of evidence stand urgently in
need of reform. The unsatisfactory character of this part of the law is taken
as axiomatic by virtually all who study and write upon the topic. 7 Anomalies,
irrationalities and archaisms abound in a subject that has received scant
attention from reformers, legislators or academic writers. Lamenting the
paucity of principles among the plethora of precedents, most analyses con-
clude with tortured apologies for irrationalities and pleas for systematic re-
8 Bentham, "General View of a Complete Code of Laws," id., Vol. I at 200-10.
4 Bentham never failed to preach the necessity of scrutinizing everything. "'I
think, therefore I exist', was the argument of Descartes; 'I exist, therefore I have no
need to think or be thought about' is the argument of jurisprudence." As quoted in
J. H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Lmv, Vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown,
1940) at 241.
5 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1975) (hereinafter Canada Report).
6Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Law of Evidence (Toronto:
Ministry of the Attorney General, 1976). (hereinafter Ontario Report).
7Much of the law of evidence is "archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises
and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly
reasoned counterprivilege to the other": Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469 at 486 per
Jackson J. (1948).
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form. The case for reform is usually based upon a number of orthodox
points: evidence rules are cumbersome, over-complex, often difficult to find
and apply, archaic and outmoded, and, on occasion, they may obstruct the
court in finding truth and doing justice."
Although evidence law as such is one of the unique features of the
English common law,9 as a separate system of rules it is comparatively re-
cent. Its growth, over the last three centuries, has been shaped by the adver-
sary system of argument and by the pivotal place of the jury in the criminal
trial. Evidence law modified the full rigour of the adversary system, which,
unmitigated, might tend to conceal or overstress certain evidence, by provid-
ing a complex set of rules to heighten the truth finding capacity of the trial.
Potentially suspect evidence was screened out by exclusionary rules, since
jurors were assumed to lack the judgment or discernment to assess its true
worth.
However, over time, evidence law accumulated excrescences and dubious
distinctions and was overlaid with a vast number of cases muddying and
distorting the rules. The process of reform, through remedial legislation or
innovative decisions, did not purge evidence law of its defects. Faced with
a Byzantine complexity that took the singular genius of the subject, Wigmore,
eleven thick volumes to analyse, 10 all who approach the subject can see the
necessity for change. Yet despite the apparent consensus in favour of the
need for reform, few topics in law reform have been as fraught with contro-
versy as evidence law. The controversy surrounding the recent Report on
Evidence of the Law Reform Commission of Canada is simply the most
recent illustration of this continuing truth.
The arguments of the reformers are often contentious; the reaction of a
number of their critics even more so. A legal profession that can adapt to
fundamental reform of land law, commercial law, or family law, nevertheless
bridles at evidence reform. When reform distorts the careful balance of the
trial by removing procedural safeguards that guarantee liberty, the opposition
is well taken. Yet it cannot be assumed that every antique rule of evidence
that blocks a court's access to truth necessarily advances and protects other
values. Too frequently we tend so to venerate the rules of evidence and simi-
larly concepts such as trial by jury, the adversary process, or the doctrine of
precedent, that they become beyond criticism, analysis, or modification. Only
when individual rules cause damage to a lawyer's case is any criticism, gen-
SBut see contra, Greenleaf on Evidence, ed. J. H. Wigmore (16th ed. Boston:
Little, Brown, 1899) at 584:
The student will not fail to observe the symmetry and beauty of this branch of the
law . . . and will rise from the study of its principles convinced, with Lord
Erskine, that they are founded in the charities of religion in the philosophy of
nature - in the truths of history, - and in the experience of common life.
9 Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 1898) at 1-2, as quoted in Murray, Evidence: A Fresh Approach (1959),
37 Can. B. Rev. 576 at 577.
OThough Wigmore on Evidence represents the fruits of an impressive lifetime of
scholarship, the work itself eloquently demonstrates, by its very bulk, how tendencies
to over-classification and ratiocination can lead to opacity, casuistry and unreason.
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erally local and specific in nature, voiced. One might also add that concern to
make evidence rules comprehensible to the general public" has not been a
major factor militating in favour of a greater lucidity in the law. The focus of
study in evidence law has been narrow. The history of statutory reform of the
law of evidence in Canada parallels the case law by dealing almost exclusively
with minor points of adjustment and rarely with major points of principle.
The fundamental questions asked by the Canada Commission, starting with
the basic "why evidence law?", have generally been considered meaningless.
H
Controversy shapes change - the end result has been that the develop-
ment of evidence reform has been long, compromised, erratic and partial.
Law reform commissions must cope not merely with the conceptual con-
straints of the existing law of evidence, but also with the less tangible bonds
of the history of prior reforms. As often happens in questions of law reform,
the argument of law reformers may be traced back to Jeremy Bentham.
Peculiarly committed to the use of legislation as the basic vehicle of socio-
legal change, he proposed a radical reform of the law of evidence.
[Mierely with a view to rectitude of decisions, to the avoidance of the mischiefs
attached to undue decision, no species of evidence whatsoever, willing or unwill-
ing, ought to be excluded: for that although in certain cases it may be right that
this or that lot of evidence, though tendered should not be admitted, yet in these
cases the reason for the exclusion rests on other grounds; viz., avoidance of vexa-
tion, expense and delay.12
Bentham argued for the abolition of exclusionary rules so that all evi-
dence, even hearsay, would initially be admitted's and then a judge would
assess the probative weight to be attached to it. Bentham rejected rules
restricting the competence of witnesses to testify and favoured removing
claims of professional privilege.' 4 His proposals were uniquely cogent, fol-
lowing closely the logic of utility; for the first time a sustained attempt was
made to identify the principles that should underly the law of evidence. From
this perspective, he made a bitter and sustained attack on the present law.
Although Bentham's attacks have generally been considered as the inspiration
of the English statutory reforms of 1843, 1851 and 1898, his more sweeping
recommendations went unheeded. This may be the first example of a general
principle that where reformers propose both systemic change and local
11 "Certainly no one save a lawyer can understand the law of evidence, and in the
opinion of this writer no lawyer, even though he may admit to understanding that law,
could [ever] explain it": Wright, The Law of Evidence: Present and Future (1942), 20
Can. B. Rev. 714.
'
2 Bentham, supra, note 1, Vol. VI at 203-04.
13 "Avoid putting an exclusion upon evidence on every occasion on which exclusion
of evidence is improper; - as it will be shown to be in every case, except those in
which it is called for by a due regard to the collateral ends of judicature.": Bentham,
id. at 12.
14This included doing away with lawyer-client privilege, though Bentham would
not admit evidence given to a Catholic priest under the seal of the confessional:
Bentham, id. at 98; Vol. VII at 366-68.
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reform, their arguments toward the broader objectives are seldom as success-
ful as their specific proposals.' 5
From Bentham's example spring Stephen's Indian Evidence Act (1872),
Wigmore's Code of Rules of Evidence (1910), the Model Code of Evidence
(1942), the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953), the California Evidence
Code (1965), the New Jersey Rules of Evidence (1967), and the Federal
Rules of Evidence (1975)."' Yet the progress of reform measured in terms
of the achievement of actual change has been gradual and halting. Of the
American reforms, the most controversial and the most stimulating was the
Model Code of Evidence. The Model Code was vigorously attacked by the
American Bar, which found its simplifications, restatements and innovations
unpalatable. Although the Code subsequently was not adopted anywhere, it has
nevertheless continued to be a vitally important influence on subsequent
reform proposals in the field of evidence.' 7 Even the more cautious Uniform
Rules of Evidence, which generated little critical reaction, had substantially
less ultimate impact than its authors had hoped: they were expressly adopted
only in the Virgin Islands, the Panama Canal Zone, and Kansas, and gener-
ously drawn from in New Jersey, Utah, and California. The new Federal
Rules of Evidence took some thirteen years to gain acceptance, accompanied
by fierce debate about the reform of the hearsay rule and the law of privileges.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence proposed in 1974, which for the most part
mirror the Federal Rules, have been adopted in eight states.'8 The slow
impact of American evidence reform becomes all the more apparent when
compared with the virtually total acceptance, by both scholars and legislators,
of the more radical Uniform Commercial Code, which was intended to effect
an even greater transformation of a body of legal doctrine and to have a
more immediate impact on the society outside the courtroom doors. 19 In
1961, Professor Edmund Morgan, the moving force behind the Model Code,
summed up the situation:
This glacier-like rate of progress makes comparison heartening in terms of geo-
logic periods, but it can hardly be a source of gratification in measuring the
15 This characterization may be too harshly drawn since it can be argued that the
usual pattern of legal change is for small changes to cumulate into major developments.
See L. M. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1975) at 291 and M. M. Shapiro, Stability and Change in
Judicial Decision-making: Incrementalism or Stare Decisis (1965), 2 Law in Trans. Q. 134.
16 Nokes, Codification of the Law of Evidence in Common Law Jurisdictions (1956),
5 I.C.L.Q. 347.
17 Paradoxically, it was also suggested that the Model Code had a harmful effect
since it caused restrictive rules to be revived that might otherwise have been left for-
gotten in the recesses of obscure case law: see remarks of Learned Hand J., quoted in
E. M. Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litiga-
tion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956) at 194.
18 Adopted in Arkansas, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota and
Oklahoma, and with slight modifications in Nebraska: see 1977-78 Reference Book
(Chicago: National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1977) at
64-69.
19 But see Friedman, supra, note 15, at 270.
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improvement in the administration of justice by courts in a time of rapidly
changing physical and social conditions. 20
I
The recent Canadian reports can thus be considered as two of a long
series of attempted reforms, which, while of varying scope and success, have
all served to bring into the open the implicit premises of the law of evidence.
Since Professor Brooks has described the genesis of the Report of the Law
Reform Commission of Canada, it may be useful to note some of the back-
ground of the Ontario Report, in terms of both the historical background and
the Commission's underlying approach to reform.
Although Ontario has had an Evidence Act since 1877, when pre- and
post-Confederation legislation was consolidated, statute law still represents
only a part of the totality of legal rules concerning evidence, an overlay on
the manifold rules of the common law. This mixture of statute law and com-
mon law has been preserved for the last hundred years, and its continuation
is endorsed by the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report. The Report is
predominantly a re-examination and revision of The Evidence Act,21 pro-
posing specific and local amendments to both common law and statute law.
Historically, there have been two earlier attempts to update and ration-
alize Ontario's evidence law. The first, by the Statute Law Commissioners,
chaired by Mr. Justice W. R. Riddell, led to the enactment of The Evidence
Act, 1910,Z2 a work of redrafting and reorganization which, for the most part,
is still in force today.23 Essentially a housekeeping and consolidation exercise,
it made minor changes, but accepted the entire conceptual framework of the
present law.
The second venture looked to be a much more ambitious attempt. In
January 1942, the Honourable Gordon Conant, Q.C., Provincial Attorney
General in the last days of the Hepburn Ministry, announced the formation of
an Ontario Law Revision Committee2 4 to study the advisability of revising the
laws of evidence,25 the administration of estates, and limitation of actions.
Professor Cecil Wright, J. J. Robinette, and Leslie Frost, later Premier, were
appointed members of the Committee which was chaired by Mr. Justice C. P.
20 Edmund M. Morgan, Practical Difficulties Impeding Reform in the Laws of
Evidence (1961), 14 Vand. L.R. 725.
21 1.S.O. 1970, c. 151.
22 S.O. 1910, c. 43.
23 Cf. Ontario Provincial Archives, R.G. 4.
24 The establishment of such a body had been recommended by F. H. Barlow in
Interim and Final Reports on a Survey of the Administration of Justice in Ontario(Toronto: Department of the Attorney General, 1939) at B75, and by the Select Com-
mittee of the Legislature Appointed to Enquire into the Administration of Justice in
Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario, Vol. LXXV, Session
1941, Part 2, Appendix 2 at 805.
25 The letter of reference noted that attention was to be focused on the admissi-
bility of written statements (business records, experts' reports) in the light of the
English Evidence Act, 1938, and in general on clarifying, simplifying and otherwise
improving procedure in the courts.
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McTague.26 Dr. D. A. MacRae, author of one of the few Canadian evidence
texts, was proposed as a consultant. The year 1942 seemed an appropriate
one to embark on evidence reform for a number of reasons. The American
Law Institute's ill-fated Model Code of Evidence was receiving a final editorial
polishing. Also, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legis-
lation in Canada had passed a Uniform Evidence Act at its meeting in Toronto
the previous September which, in January, 1942, was recommended for
enactment. Canadian legal journals of that year speculated as to the future
development of the law of evidence27 and were explicit in their praise of the
approach taken by the American Law Institute in its work towards the Model
Code of Evidence.28 Cecil Wright, in a classic polemic,2 9 used the example
of the Model Code to censure Phipson on Evidence30 and the common law
of evidence which it represented. The year 1942 was an auspicious year, but
not a happy one. The Ontario Law Revision Committee "held only one
meeting, which was a dinner meeting, and nothing further was ever done."31
Despite his enthusiasm for the Model Code, Cecil Wright's energies were
directed elsewhere and even the attempt was forgotten.
Reform of Ontario's evidence law was to be delayed until the mid-sixties.
In 1963, the Attorney General, the Honourable Frederick Cass, Q.C., ap-
pointed the recently retired Chief Justice of the High Court, the Honourable
James C. McRuer, and the Deputy Attorney General, W. B. Common, Q.C.,
as a special committee to look into medical evidence in courts of law. This
committee reported in February, 1965, and its proposals were implemented in
The Evidence Amendment Act, 1968.32 One of its recommendations was that
The Evidence Act33 of Ontario should be amended to provide for the admis-
sion in evidence of all records made in the ordinary course of business. When
in January 1966, the Attorney General asked the Ontario Law Reform Com-
mission to look into the admissibility of business records, 4 the Commission
began a process of study that was to last ten years. The Commission's Report
26 For the record, the other members were Mr. Justice J. G. Gillanders, Mr. Justice
J. A. Hope, Mr. Justice W. D. Roach, D. B. Coleman, Co. Ct., J., J. A. S. Plouffe,
Dist. Ct. J., C. L. Snyder, K.C., Deputy Attorney General, I. T. Strachan, K.C., M.P.P.,
F. H. Barlow, K.C., K. F. Mackenzie, K.C., Professor F. C. Auld, Alan B. Harvey, G. W.
Mason and John L. Wilson, K.C.: Globe and Mail, February 2, 1942; The Law Revision
Committee in Ontario (1942), 11 Fort. L.J. 246.
27D. A. MacRae, Wigmore on Evidence (1941-42), 4 U. of T. LJ. 151.
2s Cecil A. Wright, note to Morgan, Comments on the Proposed Code of Evidence
of the American Law Institute (1942), 20 Can. B. Rev. 271.
29 Cecil A. Wright, The Law of Evidence: Present and Future (1942), 20 Can. B.
Rev. 714.
30 Phipson on Evidence, ed. R. Burrows (8th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1942).
l Information drawn from the Globe and Mail, February 2, 1942 at 4, col. 1; Note,
The Ontario Law Revision Committee (1942), 4 U. of T. L.J. 399; (1941), 10 Fort.
L.J. 289; (1942), 12 Fort. LJ. 98; and from two documents in the Ontario Provincial
Archives, R.G. 4: "Law Revision Committee."
32 S.O. 1968, c. 36.
3 3 R.S.O. 1960, c. 125.
34 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Annual Report (Toronto: Department of the
Attorney General, 1967) at 10.
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on this particular aspect of evidence law was published in February 1966,
and was implemented by section 1 of The Evidence Amendment Act, 1966.85
Following this work, the Ontario Commission itself decided to embark on a
broad study of the provincial rules of evidence."6 Dr. Alan W. Mewett, a
prolific author on the subject of evidence and editor of the Criminal Law
Quarterly, was appointed as Director of the Evidence Project. He subsequently
assembled a research team of experts from law faculties: B. C. McDonald,
R. G. Murray,37 I. D. Morton, S. Borins,3 8 R. J. Delisle,89 and S. I. Bushnell.40
These individuals prepared research papers on individual topics in need of
reform, analysing the present law and suggesting modifications. These were
discussed in great detail by the entire Commission which maintains close con-
trol over policy-making processes. In some cases the papers were also dis-
cussed with a consultative committee consisting of representatives of the
judiciary and leading counsel.4 The research papers were ultimately circu-
lated on a confidential basis to other law reform agencies, such as the Law
Reform Commission of Canada, but were not made available to the general
public.42 Initially, the Commission had hoped to produce a codification, and
the California Code was viewed sympathetically. 43 This codification hope was
not realized, but at a fairly early stage a commitment was made to frame
reform proposals in draft statutory language44 as a means of focusing discus-
sion, with the result that the drafting of the Draft Act virtually preceded the
writing of the supporting text contained in the body of the Report.
One important factor affecting the Ontario project was the protraction of
the work during the early years of this decade when the pressures of other
work affected the priority given to evidence. The Ontario Commission is
fortunate in being able to initiate its own work programme, but it is also
bound by The Ontario Law Reform Commission Act45 to receive subjects
referred to it by the Attorney General. The Commission has tended to give
such references a higher working priority than other projects, and in the
35 S.O. 1966, c. 51.
36 Supra, note 34 at 22-23.
37 Id., at 23, para. 88.
3 8 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Third Annual Report 1969 (Toronto: Min-
istry of the Attorney General, 1970) at 13, para. 47.
89 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Fourth Annual Report 1970 (Toronto: Min-
istry of the Attorney General, 1971) at 12, para. 42.
40 Ontario Report, supra, note 6 at 251.
41 The consultative committee consisted of the Honourable G. A. Gale, Chief Jus-
tice of Ontario, the Honourable Campbell Grant, the Honourable John W. Brooke, the
Honourable E. Patrick Hartt, His Honour Judge F. C. Hayes, His Honour Judge J. A.
Clare, F. W. Callaghan, Q.C., Assistant Deputy Attorney General, P. DeC. Cory, Q.C.,
Ross G. Gray, Q.C., B. J. MacKinnon, Q.C., P. B. C. Pepper, Q.C., Julian H. Porter,
J. T. Weir, Q.C., and Clay M. Powell: supra, notes 38 and 39.
42 See statement by Hon. Dalton A. Bales, Q.C., in Ont. Leg. Debs., Supply Com-
mittee. June 26, 1972 at S-1578.
43 Supra, note 34 at 23, para. 89.
44 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Fifth Annual Report 1971 (Toronto: Min-
istry of the Attorney General, 1971) at 15, para. 58.
45 S.O. 1964, c. 78.
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early seventies, three references, on Sunday observance legislation, on the
administration of Ontario courts, and on consumer warranties and guarantees,
largely monopolised the Commission's time. The Commission's important
work on family law also tended to pre-empt any discussion of evidence
reform. 46 It is impossible to assess the influence of this loss of momentum on
the Report ultimately produced, but it may have tended to fragment the basic
principles of reform and to make individual chapters stand as discrete topics.
The practical need to limit the scope of the inquiry, coupled with the prov-
incial focus of the project, meant that research concentrated on particular
aspects of evidence law rather than reviewing the entire system of proof, the
structure of the trial, and the merits of the adversary system. Such an ambi-
tious project could only be conducted as a major national inquiry involving
close federal and provincial co-operation and the assistance of the practising
bar. While there were hopes that such a shared project would be feasible, 47
this ultimately proved impossible. Five years of research had taken place in
Ontario when in March 1972, the first research programme of the Law
Reform Commission of Canada was approved and their evidence project
began its work in earnest.
The drafting of the Ontario Report was undertaken by the project
Director, Dr. Alan Mewett, who was also responsible for a large proportion
of original research, and for advising the Commission at every stage of the
project. Dr. Mewett's draft Report drew together the research contained in
the papers prepared by the research team. This draft Report was discussed
at length by the Commission and was prepared for publication by an internal
Commission editorial team, working under the general direction of the Vice-
Chairman, the Honourable James C. McRuer.
Although the Ontario Report does not dwell at length on the theoretical
foundations of the undertaking, it does reveal a complex set of attitudes and
opinions. It essentially accepts the traditional structure and procedures of
the trial, occasionally suggesting alternatives to present practices. A separate
Commission study dealt with the administration of Ontario courts, and the
revision of the rules of civil practice is currently being undertaken by a com-
mittee chaired by Walter B. Williston, Q.C.48 This contrasts with the evi-
dence project of the federal Law Reform Commission which has been carried
on at the same time as a project focusing on pre-trial procedures in criminal
cases. Although Ontario's work encompasses many areas of provincial evi-
dence law, it does not purport to provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis
of every rule of evidence. Rather it is intended to take a more pragmatic
functional approach, concentrating on problem areas which require reform.
As a result, the Report contains a number of major reform proposals to-
gether with a number of chapters that conclude that since, in many areas,
40 See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Seventh Annual Report 1973 (Toronto:
Ministry of the Attorney General, 1973) at 13, and Ontario Law Reform Commission,
Eighth Annual Report 1974 (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1974) at 14.
4 7 Supra, note 34 at 22, para. 86; see also statement by Hon. Arthur Wishart, Q.C., in
Ont. Leg. Debs., October 20, 1969 at 7260.
4 8 See W. B. Williston, Revising the Ontario Rules of Practice - The Work of the
Civil Procedure Revision Committee (1977), 1 Advocates' Quarterly 18.
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the present law appears to be functioning satisfactorily, reform would be
undesirable. Change for its own sake is not an objective.
When the Ontario Report speaks of "preserv[ing] the sound and estab-
lished principles" yet "adapt[ing the] law ... to... the changing conditions
of modem society,"49 it defines a specific and limited role for itself. While it
admits that "some of the rules of evidence.., are obscure" and that "others
[are] obsolete," it concludes that "in most areas, the basic principles under-
lying the present law are sound," that ". . . the common law approach to
evidence is basically sound, and that it would be unwise to reform the law
in radically new directions. '" Ontario rejects codification by an argument
which links codification with linguistic difficulties in interpreting new provi-
sions, which, it is argued, "could seriously disrupt the administration of
justice."5'
The alternative chosen by the Commission is to make specific necessary
reforms, relying on "the organic growth of the common law"' 2 to cope with
further change. The courts have, in the past, illustrated their ability to fill in any
gaps in the law. Codification is thought "to inhibit the growth and develop-
ment of the common law," although it is also admitted that the "process
of judicial reform.., is ... slow and uncertain. 15 4 The Ontario Commission
seems to contemplate that the law of evidence must receive an on-going
review, with periodic legislative amendments and alterations where necessary.
The common law is accorded a special respect 5 and other law reform bodies
are criticized for departing too widely from common law principles" or for
giving too much discretion to the judiciary.57 Only in a few carefully de-
limited areas is the Ontario Report prepared to expand judicial discretion
or power of choice. 58 Although the Ontario Report contains copious footnote
references to the reforms adopted in other jurisdictions, in only a few in-
stances is it prepared to adopt these outright,59 generally developing new, and
occasionally unprecedented, proposals of its own. The Report demonstrates
a desire to clarify uncertain areas of the law and avoid confusion.60
Despite the fact that the Ontario Report does not contain any explicit
49 Ontario Report, supra, note 6 at ix.
50 Id. at xi.
51 Id.
52 One would hope that the organic growth described will be undertaken in the
spirit of Ares v. Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608 rather than Myers v. D.P.P., [1965] A.C.
1001.
53 Ontario Report, supra, note 6 at 14.
54 Id. at 12.
55 Id., at 108, 145, 152.
56 Id., at 15.
57 Id., at 14-15.
58 See, for example, id. at 70-71 (evidence obtained by illegal means) and 221 fl.
(executive privilege).
591d. at 164 (court experts proposal taken from Federal Rules of Evidence); at
274 (judicial notice section adopted from Federal Rules of Evidence); at 218 (various
admissions proposals derived from Model Code of Evidence).
60 Id., at 28, 121.
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declaration of its support for relevance as the basis of admissibility, the motif
is strongly felt throughout.6' A consistent theme of the Report is that since
exclusionary rules prevent the court from having all possible evidence before
it, the loss of evidence must be counter-balanced by other gains or by the
preservation of overriding values. 62 For this reason, private privilege is
treated very differently than in the federal Report: a general professional
privilege is rejected, marital privilege is abolished, and the lawyer-client
privilege is not expanded. In considering the law of executive privilege, the
Commission broadened the grounds of claim but also added tighter proce-
dural controls.63 A number of other chapters show that the Commission is
more concerned with the expeditious conduct of the trial and the fair admin-
istration of justice than it is to use legal norms to safeguard values external
to the legal process.6
The Ontario Report is its own justification, and since it must be assessed
on its own merits, it is not necessary here to offer any further arguments in
support of its proposals. The Ontario Commission's objectives are modest
and understandable, given its overriding attachment to the existing common
law. Moreover, one suspects that the Ontario Commission sensed no strong
pressures for reform that might have compelled a more radical posture.
Among the different groups potentially affected - the general public, the
practising bar and judiciary, and the academic community - there is not the
pressing interest in reform so clearly seen, for example, in the area of family
law. It is perhaps not surprising that comparatively little public interest has
been shown in this aspect of law reform. The technicalities of evidence law
are the unique province of the legal profession, despite the fascination the
public may have with the drama of the trial.65 Whether one views reform as
a response to a compelling public interest, or as the resolution of a major
clash of mores or social values, the conclusion unhappily seems to be that
evidence is not a locus of concern on either view. If systemic change is truly
desired, the constituency for such reform is not revealed by the comments
of the public.
(1 See Thayer, supra, note 9 at 264; Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 402; Cali-
fornia Evidence Code, Rules 350, 351; Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 7(f); Kansas
Evidence Code, Rule 60 - 407(f).
02 See, for example, the Ontario Report, supra, note 6 at 21, 133.
03 Burger CJ. in U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1973) at 710:
Whatever their [the privileges'] origins, these exceptions to the demand for every
man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search for truth.
04 Compare the explicit identification of interests in the statement of R. Delisle and
N. Brooks in The Evidence Project (1973), 4 Can. Bar J. (N.S.) 28 at 28:
In formulating a rule of evidence the following interests must also be considered:
the conservation of resources, the efficiency of the entire legal system, the moral
acceptability of the courts' ultimate decisions, the manifest fairness of the pro-
ceedings, the need for simplification and finality, the preservation of the dramatic
unity of the trial, the protection of the integrity of the participants, and the sup-
port of independent social policies such as protecting certain relations and con-
trolling the governmental process.
65 Canada Report, supra, note 5 at 1; M. S. Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Un-
scientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theatre (1976), 28 Stan. L.R. 81.
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Nor do the opinions of the practising bar indicate any clear direction
for reform. The profession jealously protects the legal values enshrined in
the trial process and the adversary system. 68 In the year since the two Cana-
dian evidence reports were published, the profession has not as a body dis-
played great zeal to implement either report. It has shown concern about the
practical implications of the federal Code6 7 and appears to be skeptical of
the merits of codification.68 Nor do reported Canadian cases on the law of
evidence reveal any marked judicial dissatisfaction with the rules joined with
enthusiasm for wholesale reform. The two evidence projects have been largely
staffed by those teaching the law of evidence in Canadian law schools who
have a unique interest in the rationalization and systemization of this aspect
of the law. 9 However this group is not sufficiently large, organized or poli-
tically powerful to be able to generate compelling pressure for reform.
The lack of a sizeable constituency for reform has had a number of
significant results, and will probably shape future decisions about implemen-
tation. For example, the actual goals of reform tend to be indeterminately
expressed. Law reform will bring, we are assured, a more reasonable balance
between the flexibility that would result from making the individual judge
the sole arbiter of admissibility, and the specificity that would result from an
attempt to make a set of rules so detailed and so meticulous as to cover
virtually every conceivable situation. 70 However it could as easily be argued
that such a balance is currently displayed in the common law.
IV
It must also be remembered that the tradition of the common law rests
heavily on the rules of evidence. Built up slowly and haphazardly through
the accretion of case law, the rules of evidence have been seldom and recently
modified through legislation; growth has been gradual, organic, spasmodic,
responding to the stimulus of individual case-situations as they reveal defects.
The common law tradition, however, represents more than a historical de-
66 In this sense it may well be true that the Ontario Report has captured the pro-
fession's sense of the type, though not necessarily the particular detail, of reforms
needed. See F. E. Dowrick, Lawyers' Values for Law Reform (1963) 79 L.Q.R. 556;
M. Weber, On Law in Economy and Society, trans. Shils and Rheinstein (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1954) at 201-03, 316.67 Thayer characterized evidence as a whole as resulting from practical understand-
ing rather than overarching theory:
A system of evidence like this, thus worked out at the forge of daily experience
in the trial of causes, not created, or greatly changed, until lately, by legislation,
not the fault of any man's systematic reflections or forecast, is sure to exhibit at
every step the mark of its origin. It is not concerned with nice definitions, or the
exact academic operations of the logical faculty. Its rules originate in the instinc-
tive suggestions of good sense, legal experience, and a sound, practical under-
standing. Supra, note 9 at 3-4.
6 8 R. P. Anderson, A Criticism of the Evidence Code: Some Practical Considerations
(1977), 11 U.B.C. L. Rev. 163; critical comments were also made by the then Chief
Justice of Ontario, the Hon. W. Z. Estey at his swearing-in, and by the Criminal Lawyers
Association: Toronto Star, February 8, 1977 at A2, Toronto Star, February 9, 1977 at
A3, Globe and Mail, February 10, 1977 at 1.
69 Weber, supra, note 66 at 198, 205.
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scription; it also comprehends a potent ideological ideal, the commitment of
the legal culture to the values of legalism:71 that justice is best guaranteed
by procedural safeguards and by consistent rule-following. Legalism is also
embodied in the Langdellian pedagogy of North American legal education
and closely connected with the process values of formally rational law, judi-
cial subordination and the denial of any extensive judicial contribution to
policy-making, and the preference for certainty and linguistic stability. The
commitment to these values is widespread within the legal profession, al-
though it tends to be an impulsive one since no one has yet succeeded in
fashioning an accurate and coherent theory of the legal rationality of the
common law.
Those who would depart from the slow growth of the common law argue
that the pressures and complexity of contemporary society highlight both the
unsatisfactory element of evidence law and the necessity for thorough reform.
The suggestion is clear that the common law lacks sufficient dynamic poten-
tial to effect the necessary fundamental changes. We may have become so
habituated to the common law of evidence that we fail to recognize the basic
uncertainty of the legal rules, the massive amount of discretion that still
remains to the trial judge and the necessity for change. Simply to reformulate
the common law norms will not change the system, because the characteristic
form of reasoning within our legal system would remain. This reasoning
focuses narrowly on specific rules, and the interpretation of set forms of
words, and neglects the importance of underlying purposes and principles
and the social role of law.
Codification is often seen as a threat to the traditional commitments of
the legal profession, and on the question of codification the Ontario and
Canada evidence reports are in sharp contrast. The Ontario Report further
consolidates the evidence rules, extending the pattern of The Evidence Act 72
of 1877 and making no attempt at comprehensiveness. By accepting the tra-
ditional approach and values of the legal system, the Ontario Report sidesteps
the serious jurisprudential issues posed by other reform proposals. It sees the
future of Canadian evidence law as an outgrowth from present norms and
practices, revised to take account of modem conditions and practical diffi-
culties. The federal Code, however, marks a bold departure from traditional
concepts of statute law in its extent, form, and drafting.7 It also poses a direct
challenge to the myth of the rationality of the common law and questions the
specific nature of legal argumentation within that system.
At a minimum, a code attempts to restate clearly all the rules of law in
70 Model Code of Evidence (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1942) at xii.
71 See I. Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).
7 2 R.S.O. 1877, c. 62.
7 3 Earlier advocates of codification of the law of evidence included Lord Wright,
Legal Essays and Addresses (Cambridge: University Press, 1939) at 338-39; the
Evershed Committee - Final Report of the Committee on Supreme Court Practice and
Procedure, (1953; Cmd., 8878) at 95, 106 and 325; J. H. Wigmore, Code of the Rules
of Evidence (3rd ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942); and Bentham, supra, note 1. Such
is the ambiguity of the term "codification" that these authors all essentially proposed
quite different exercises.
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a particular area, together with the basic underlying principles. 4 Codifications
demand basic changes of attitude and reasoning. Common law paradigms of
legal reasoning, the reconciliation of case law and the interpretation of
statutes, are strained by a code which repudiates the primacy of precedent
and which requires explicitly teleological interpretation of generic norms.
Codification implies a particular view of language since it demands that spe-
cial emphasis be placed on the wording of the code. It focuses attention on
the purposes revealed or implied beyond the surface rules.
Codification as proposed by the Law Reform Commission of Canada
would have a profound impact on our theory of common law argumentation
and judicial decision. By generalizing norms and by aspiring to comprehen-
siveness, a code must perforce result in an expansion of judicial creativity
and discretion. The results of the federal Proposed Code will be hard to
predict and measure, but we may assume that they will be both complex
and substantial.
Indeed, the difficult issues are only revealed when one determines the
fundamental goals of a codification, and whether the federal Code achieves
its proclaimed purpose. Thus it becomes critically important to examine the
relationship of the Proposed Code to the present law and the implicit chal-
lenges it poses for conventional legal argumentation in those situations where
the result of the application of the rules is not readily predictable. 75 As
suggested earlier, law reform often poses difficulties for long-standing notions
of the basic autonomy of legal thought, and the Proposed Code postulates a
novel conception of the common law, the judicial role, and the logical basis
of argument and decision.
Unhappily, at the crucial point of the Proposed Code's relationship to
the common law, the Commission's thinking is hedged, almost fuzzy. At times
it appears that the Code merely imposes a gloss on the common law; at others
that it is intended to abolish the common law; or that it is to be supplemented
by common law stripped of its present precedential force.
The Proposed Code contains sweeping general sections, such as section
3: "[mlatters of evidence not provided for by the Code shall be determined
in the light of reason and experience so as to secure the purpose of this Code."
The purpose of the Code, as shown by section 1, is: "to establish rules of
evidence to help secure the just determination of proceedings, and to that
end to assist in the ascertainment of the facts in issue, in the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, and in the protection of other important
social interests."
Section 2 seems to imply that the common law is abrogated: "[t]his Code
shall be liberally construed to secure its purpose and is not subject to the rule
that statutes in derogation of the common law shall be strictly construed." 7
74 See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Law: Towards a Codification
(Study Paper, 1977) at 2, 16.
7 5 See, generally, R. M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977) at 80-130.
70 Cf. California Evidence Code, s. 2; Ghana Evidence Decree 1975, N.R.C.D. 323,
ss. 178(3), (4).
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This interpretation seems to be borne out by section 4(1) which states that
"[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible except as provided in this Code or any
other Act."77 The Commission speaks of replacing the common law78 and a
number of commentators have seized on this to characterize the Code as
abolishing the common law.79 Yet in the other official language the Commis-
sion describes the impact of codification in less absolute terms: "i remplace
le common law comme source suppldtive du droit de la preuve."80 Case law
seems to re-appear, "while past cases can be examined for the light they can
shed, under the Code they should not constitute an impediment to informed
and experienced judgment." 8' This last point is expanded within the Report
when the Commission comments on section 3 by noting that "[pirecedent
is ... a major source of experience and may be looked to, but it will not
have binding force."82 The cautious practitioner will conclude from all this
that despite all the talk of abolition of the common law, it may nevertheless
be prudent not to discard the ostensibly superseded wisdom of the standard
texts by Wigmore, Cross, Sopinka and Lederman, or Glasbeck.
Edmund Morgan in his foreword to the Model Code of Evidence explicitly
identifies an over-rigid system of stare decisis as the vitiating flaw of evidence.
The rules of evidence have been developed in myriads of cases, wherein the later
judges have felt themselves bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to adhere to
the pronouncements of their predecessors but bound also to avoid the absurdities
which the simple application of these pronouncements would produce. In attempt-
ing to escape this dilemma they have engrafted qualifications, refinements and
exceptions upon the earlier rules, so that the law of evidence has grown irregularly
and in haphazard fashion, one rule seeming to have no relation in reason to
another. 83
Although the federal Report signals a break with the traditional theory of
stare decisis, it does not provide an unequivocal alternative theory of argu-
ment and decision.
The Model Code of Evidence hinted at a new judicial role, in which
sufficient discretion would be vested in the judge at trial so that he or she
would not feel constrained to twist the decision or the reasoning of the judg-
ment to conform to a set of dubiously reconcilable precedents.8 4 The icono-
77 See also ss. 32 and 54.
78 Canada Report, supra, note 5 at 6.
79 Mr. Justice D. C. McDonald in Canadian Bar Association National, October,
1976, at 11. Paul Rothstein, An Evidence Code: The American Experience (1977), 36
C.R.N.S. 274 at 284.
80 Canada Report, supra, note 5 at 7: French text (italics added).
8 1 Law Reform Commission of Canada, press release headed "Evidence Code Pro-
posed for Canada," Ottawa: December 28, 1975 at 3.
82 Canada Report, supra, note 5 at 51.
83 E. M. Morgan, Foreword to Model Code of Evidence, supra, note 70 at 3-4.
84 Wigmore supports the need for more flexibility in his Code of Evidence:
What the system of Evidence needs is, not so much another set of rules, or fewer
rules, as a judiciary flexibility in their application. The rules should be guides,
not chains. This great curative feature can be obtained, and by a few simple
though powerful principles.
Supra, note 73, at xiii.
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clastic challenge to traditional attitudes becomes explicit in the federal Report.
However, to make new uses of precedent and construct a novel theory of legal
argumentation which is explicitly purposive and value-oriented is likely to
produce great difficulties, particularly in preparation for trial 8, (for example,
who can predict when a claim of privilege will be successful?), and in taking
appeals (appellate tribunals will have to stifle any inclination to substitute
their discretion for that of the judge at first instance).86 Any increase in the
freedom of action of individual judges is likely to be counterpoised by a lack
of uniformity in the legal system as a whole, given the necessary limitations
on the power of appellate judges to supervise and bring consistency into
disparate decisions.
The American movement for codification of the law of evidence has been
well documented. Codification efforts were built upon a polemic critique of
the illogicalities of the common law of evidence, arguing that codification
provided the best method of simultaneously clearing deformities from the
law, simplifying the law where possible and achieving a system of rules readily
comprehensible by both bench and bar. The amount of hard thinking devoted
to the various codes is impressive, and the codes contain many innovative
and excellent features. Yet the codification movement achieved only sporadic
acceptance.
In a sense, the Model Code is typical because it has been regarded as
prototypical. The drafters of the Code lobbied vigorously for the implementa-
tion of the Code in legislation. This objective was in distinct contrast to the
other work of the American Law Institute, the various Restatements of the
law, whose purpose was explicitly didactic, and whose impact can only be
traced inferentially in the reasoning of law teaching and appellate opinions.87
Yet the legal profession as a whole could not be convinced of the wisdom of
the Model Code. Wigmore expressed doubts about codification along the
lines of the Model Code and produced a new edition of his own Code of
Evidence in reply.
Nor have the recent American codes been universally or uncritically
welcomed. The Federal Rules of Evidence occasioned critical comment from
a number of judges88 and legislators 9 who rejected the very idea that the law
of evidence was amenable to detailed codification. Case by case development
was still thought to be the soundest route to reform. Academic writers have
analysed the shortcomings of individual provisions of the Federal Rules,
85L. M. Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket (1961),
14 Vand. L.R. 741 at 775: "It is uncomfortable to go to trial without knowing whether
important evidence will be let in or excluded."
86 Section 11 of the Draft Evidence Code is intended to curb this tendency. Cf.
Model Code of Evidence, supra, note 70, Rules 6 and 7.
8 7 See, for example, the remarks of Laskin J.A. in R. v. Strand Electric Ltd., [1969]
1 O.R. 190 at 200, as quoted in the Ontario Report, supra, note 6 at 217.
-
8 See remarks of Goldberg J. and Friendly C.J., quoted in House Report No. 93-
650 as set out in Title 28 U.S.C.A. at 824.
89 See remarks of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman, set out id. at 844. See also Spiegelberg,
Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary (U.S. Senate, 93rd
Congress, 2nd Session, 1974) at 96.
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which were produced by a highly talented group over many years with exten-
sive commentary,90 and thus thought to be the best effort at reform.
V
However, it would be both inaccurate and unfair to tie the historic oppo-
sition of the legal profession to codification to prejudice, misunderstanding,
conservatism, or narrow chauvinism. More is at stake in a move towards a
codified system of law than simply sweeping away myth and myopia. In a
subtle, though profound way, codification affects the basic intellectual and
institutional foundation of the common law system. Critics often react emo-
tionally and directly to a challenge that is sensed rather than comprehended
in its totality. They sense tendencies within law reform, perhaps inevitable
tendencies, that seek to transform the nature of law and the scope of the legal
system.9' Such law reform activity is explicitly concerned with the under-
standing of the place of legal change in social change, and necessarily chal-
lenges the assumed rationality of the law.
Similar tendencies were shown in the nineteenth-century European codi-
fication movement, when evidence laws comparable to the common law rules92
were swept away by a system of rational evaluation of evidence.93 Weber's
Law in Economy and Society describes the process in terms that may also be
aptly applied to the federal Code: "modem... legal developments have con-
tained tendencies favourable to the dilution of legal formalism. At a first
glance, the displacement of the formally bound law of evidence by the "free
evaluation of proof" appears to be of a merely technical character .... [The]
new system clearly appears as a product of substantive rationalization ... It
is clear that, through the system of free evaluation of proof, a very consider-
able domain which was once subject to formal juristic thought is being in-
creasingly withdrawn therefrom."94
Codification by its deliberate espousal of open-ended standards and pur-
posive reasoning may tend to undermine the autonomy of legal decision-
making and to deprive law of its specialist character.95 The principles of
argument to which appeal must be made, such as "reason and experience," 98
90L. H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay (1974), 87 Harv. L. Rev. 957 at 972, n. 52.
01 Hinted at in two recent articles: R. A. Samek, A Case for Social Law Reform
(1977), 55 Can. B. Rev. 409; J. N. Lyon, Law Reform Needs Reform (1974), 12
Osgoode Hall L.J. 421.
9 2 Weber, supra, note 66 at 227.
9 3 Ontario Report, supra, note 6 at 3-6.
94 Weber, supra, note 66 at 227; Max Rheinstein's footnote to this passage, written
in 1953, is revealing:
The entire system of formal proof was swept away by the procedural reforms of
the nineteenth century and replaced by the system of free or rational proof, which
did away with most of the exclusionary rules, released the judge from his arith-
metical shackles, and authorized him to evaluate the evidence in the light of
experience and reason. (Emphasis added.)
95 Weber, id. at 279; R. M. Unger, Law in Modem Society (New York: Free
Press, 1976) at 195; R. M. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press,
1975) at 95.
96 Draft Code, supra, note 5, section 3.
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"prejudice, confusion, waste of time,"97 "human dignity and social values, 08
"considerations of policy and logic,"99 "public interest in privacy,"' 00 "harsh-
ness,"'x01 "interests in maintaining secrecy,"' 02 represent not fixed legal con-
cepts in the form of legal rules or standards, but norms derived from the
general principles of ethic, utility, expedience or an ideology.'03 While no
one today would deny that the judicial process must on occasion have recourse
to considerations of substantive rationality, the federal Proposed Code goes
far beyond this recognition to demand that a trial judge engage in the balanc-
ing of competing values to determine the basic question of the admissibility
of particular evidence. By their very nature, values may guide a judge, but
they do not dictate a decision one way or another or control discretion. 0 4
Although one can only applaud the federal Commission's willingness to
explore new directions, I have grave doubts about the implications of some
of its work. When the federal Commission expresses its distaste for tradi-
tionally limited legal argument and speaks of principles, basic philosophy,
purposes and values, it allies itself with some of the most persuasive recent
jurisprudential writing. In this respect one of the most important general
features of the Draft Code is that it encourages the judge to frame decisions
and to refashion argument in terms of values and purposes. The movement to
discredit black-letter legal positivism has been supported by other intellectual
theories which undermine the views of knowledge, language and decision on
which conventional conceptions of judicial decision-making rest. As a partial
reaction to the failure of these older theories, increasing stress has been
placed on purposive interpretation as the best guide to the just and reasonable
application of legal norms. The meaning of a rule, and thus its scope and
impact, is said to be linked to a decision about how best to achieve the pur-
poses ascribed to a rule. Despite the obvious attractions of such a theory,
purposive interpretation is likely, for a number of reasons, to be ad hoc,
uncertain, shifting and subjective. Purposes are likely to be highly complex,
expressed in the most general and abstract way, and constantly changing.
Thus the most effective method of achieving a desired end is likely to change
over time and over different situations.
In a large number of areas, ranging from commercial law to family law
and criminal law, law reform proposals have suggested making greater use
of open-ended standards, further delegation of discretionary powers, a more
97 Id., ss. 1, 5, 59 (2).
98 Id., s. 15(2).
99 Id., s. 14(4).
100 Id., s. 40.
101 Id., s. 57.
102 Id., s. 44(1).
103 See Weber, supra, note 66 at 63.
104 "The purposive theory of adjudication requires not only a criterion for the
definition of controlling policies, but also a method for balancing them off against one
another. In the absence of a procedure for policy decision, the judge will inescapably
impose his own subjective preferences, or someone else's, on the litigants": Unger,
Knowledge and Politics, supra, note 95 at 95. See Weber, id. at 75.
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active role for judges, 05 and have argued for a broadening of the bases of
legal argument. However, by doing so, we have simply substituted a new set
of problems for the old. Discredited formalism has yielded to a chimera.
I suspect that the federal Commission has consistently overestimated the
usefulness of explicit reference to values as guides to both reform and deci-
sion. Value-analysis has very distinct limitations as a heuristic or conceptual
technique. Values simply do not go far enough, are too vague, indistinct, or
incoherent to serve as useful pointers toward either explanation or change
of a society, or to guide a judge towards a just decision.
North American legal thought has, in recent years, moved towards an
explicitly policy-oriented model of legal discourse, designed to compel both
decision-makers and decision-analysts to make explicit choices between com-
peting values. One may therefore expect to see, in the next few years, the
emergence of a jurisprudence of values focusing on this pivotal notion within
social psychology.
The very notion of value reveals many difficulties. Values are deep, com-
plex, often irrationally held, linked to emotional preferences; they lie at the
core of an individual's life. They are the bedrock on which beliefs, attitudes and
opinions are grounded and constructed as an individual encounters the world.
Values tend to be shadowy, focused by symbols; they are difficult to locate,
identify, analyse, or change. Extrapolating the shared values of mass society
from these hidden individual values is a perilous task, that all too easily serves
to conceal the imposition of a particular ideological viewpoint. The concept of
value presents serious theoretical problems for those who would use it as
the key notion to understanding the place of law reform within social change.
Oliver Wendell Holmes emphasized that general principles do not de-
cide concrete cases. The insight remains salutary in law reform. The values
of liberty, physical integrity, security of property and social order, the whole
range of values expressed and protected in the Canadian Bill of Rights, are
important and indeed essential, but they do not provide or dictate a solution
to any problem expressed at other than the most general level. Virtually every
legal problem, whether approached as a law case, or law reform topic, will
yield, if analysed, a multiplicity of values, values that often conflict and
which require weighing and balancing. In traditional jurisprudence, when
social values and interests come into conflict, the function of law is to recon-
cile, to resolve, to mediate, to do justice, responsibilities which cannot be
abdicated in the name of either a consensus or dissensus of values within
society. Too much of the thinking of the federal Commission assumes a
consensus model of society in which values are uniform, stable and shared.
If the Canadian mosaic, which may also be a mosaic of contrasting and con-
flicting values, fails to provide a consensus on which to base reform, where
is the law reformer to turn? Is he or she simply expected to take a conserva-
tive stance of accepting whatever injustices may be sanctioned by majority
opinion or values? Can one ignore the fact that, all too often, so-called shared
values are the prejudices and interests of dominant social and professional
105 Meyer, Evidence in the Future (1973), Can. B. Rev. 107 at 111.
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groups rather than common perceptions of the good? For law reformers, as
much as for judges, it is generally impossible to appeal to any stable, authori-
tative, coherent and universally accepted set of values to guide interpretation
and to dictate a decision. Decision-makers must choose which of competing
sets of beliefs in society should be given priority; diversity is the truth of
human experience.
However limited the role of value analysis may be, it does have its place.
In unsettled or rapidly changing areas of the law it often becomes necessary
to make explicit use of open-ended standards, or to entrust to judges policy
decisions which may turn on value choices. The shared understandings to
which we refer as values impinge on the legal decision-maker in a number
of ways. Not only do they guide behaviour in contexts unregulated by legal
norms, they provide the substantive content of open standards like due care,
unconscionability and reasonableness that are used in areas where the variety
of circumstances and the competition of opposing policies is such that no set
of specific rules would be satisfactory or workable. However, one can reason-
ably doubt whether every area of the law exhibits such conflicts between
either policies or moral theories so as to justify subordinating the possibility
of a set of specific rules to generally expressed open standards.
By their very nature, law reform studies often focus on areas where
established legal rules are under strain from a conflict of policies generated
by the pressures of social change. Indeed it often seems attractive to propose
the introduction of open standards as reforms, leaving their precise impact
and scope to time and future circumstance in the continuing adjudication of
disputes. There is then a deliberate trade-off between the modicum of cer-
tainty necessary for citizens to orient their conduct by reference to legal
norms, or for lawyers to give advice or prepare for litigation, and the need
to expand judicial consideration of values and policies in individual cases.'00
However, there has been no convincing argument presented to show that the
law of evidence is under the contemporary stress of such unmanageable con-
flict between policies that tradition and experience must be discounted or
discarded.
VI
The critical articles contained in this symposium assess the detailed
recommendations proposed by the two Commissions. Beyond these questions
of substance and the questions of underlying philosophy addressed earlier,
the two Reports differ markedly in style and tone. While the Ontario Report,
being essentially problem-oriented, at times seems unfocused, it is copiously
footnoted and readers who do not find the proposed reforms convincing, will
yet be able to assess the alternative approaches of different jurisdictions set
forth in the Report. The Report does not centre on a particular unifying
theme or purpose, but adopts an essentially pragmatic approach. From its
tone the Report is written primarily for the interested legal practitioner or
student rather than the general public.
1o6 Weber, supra, note 66 at 309; Unger, Law in Modern Society, supra, note 95
at 197.
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This contrasts with the introduction to the Canada Report 07 which
attempts to set out the Commission's philosophy of reform and to justify the
purposive analysis that it seeks to apply to all rules of evidence. Though the
philosophy underlying the Report appears to draws disparate recommenda-
tions into a coherent unified whole, at times the Report is unpinned and
under-argued. While one recognizes that the desirability of reaching a broad
public through untechnical and simplified discussion is a cardinal objective of
the Commission, 08 evidence law is nevertheless primarily of interest to the
legal profession. It may be that in the conscious attempt to reach a broader
public, the Commission was less successful in convincing a legal profession
whose support was important if implementation was to be ensured.
For example, at a discussion of evidence reform held by the Criminal
Justice Section at the August, 1976, Annual Meeting of the Canadian Bar
Association in Winnipeg, the fear was expressed that provisions, such as sec-
tion 14(4) of the Code, which states that where two presumptions conflict
the presumption "founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic"
shall apply, would lead to uncertainty and disparity in the application of the
law.10 9 There is a lot to be said for and against this principle, yet the Report
contains only three lines of commentary on the section, which neither explain
nor justify it:
Occasionally two presumptions conflict. Subsection (4) provides a method for
resolving such conflict. The one founded on the weightier considerations pre-
vails.110
No one could guess from this brief passage that the subject could be treated
differently and that the merits of the Canada Commission's position had been
persuasively put elsewhere."' Section 14(4) is in fact a slightly rewritten
version of Rule 15 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which also contained
a coherent defence of the rule, together with an argument for rejecting the
traditional Thayer theory that conflicting presumptions simply cancel each
other out. Thayer's view had been adopted in Rule 704(2) of the Model
107 Unsparingly criticized by A. W. Mewett, Law Reform Commission of Canada
Report on Evidence (1976), 18 Crim. L.Q. 155.
108 W. F. Ryan, The Law Reform Commission of Canada (1976), 25 U.N.B.L.J.
3 at 12.
109 In his article cited supra, note 68 at 186, Mr. Justice Anderson deals with the
section as follows:
If the Rule in Hodge's Case is too confusing, as submitted by the proponents of
the Evidence Code, what is to be said of such a 'simple and accessible rule, readily
understood by laymen' as is contained in section 14(4) of the Evidence Code,
which reads as follows:
(4) Where two presumptions conflict the presumption founded on the weight-
ier considerations of policy and logic shall apply, and if there is no such
preponderance both presumptions shall be disregarded.
Need any more be said!
110 Canada Report, supra, note 5 at 61.
"'See generally, E. C. Mengel, Jr., Conflicting Presumptions (1965), 10 Villa-
nova L.R. 324 and McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, ed. E. W. Cleary
et al. (2nd ed. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1972). § 345 at p. 832.
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Code of Evidence, against the advice of both Morgan and Maguire.1 2 The
issue is a minor but a contentious one and is lucidly joined in both the Uni-
form Rules and Model Code. Section 14(4) can be seen, by the examples
there given, to be both sensible and workable. Yet the interested Canadian
practitioner is confronted with an unargued statement in the Canada Report
that simply states: take it - or leave it. It is hardly surprising that section
14(4) was attacked since it is an unfamiliar approach, that stands without
authorities, without supporting arguments, without an analysis of the problem
or of the alternatives. Yet when explained it is, in the words of the comment
to the Uniform Rules, "the best and simplest solution, and that most con-
sistent with good sense."
Unpinned by either sufficient argument or authority, cocksure logic can-
not convince. If logic was sufficient proof of the wisdom of reform we would
even now be in the promised land of Bentham's hopes."1 3 But reformers must
overcome long-standing tradition, ingrained attitudes and ideological commit-
ments,114 and that requires a thorough marshalling or arguments to explain
proposals and overcome objections. The two reports have been described as
falling short of the best work of either Commission, in cogency and clarity,
when compared with the evidence reforms of American, English or Austra-
lian agencies.
VII
Today there is a great measure of uniformity in Canadian evidence law.
When contrasted with the United States, we have few major difficulties in
ensuring the uniform application of evidence rules, since both federal and
provincial legislation share, to a very great extent, the same informing prin-
ciples of the common law. Not only does the common law remain in effect
in some areas, but the legislative reforms which have taken place have pre-
served a considerable measure of similarity between the various provincial
Evidence Acts, and the Canada Evidence Act.11
While it has sometimes been suggested that it might be desirable to have
a separate statute dealing with evidence in civil cases,110 and another purely
concerned with criminal cases, this would be difficult to achieve given the
present division of legislative responsibility for effecting such a change. The
constitutional problem is difficult, and complicated by a number of statutory
provisions. For example, while the Canada Evidence Act is stated to apply
to criminal proceedings and to those civil procedings over which Parliament
has jurisdiction, section 37 of the Act provides that, subject to the Canada
Evidence Act and other federal statutes, the provincial laws in force will also
112 Morgan sets out all the issues clearly, together with examples, in his Introduction
to the Model Code of Evidence, supra, note 70 at 54-64, and in the Commentary, id.
at 314-18.
113 Bentham, supra, note 1, Vol. I at 194.
114 Weber, supra, note 66 at 316.
15 R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10.
116 J. Sopinka and S. Lederman, Evidence in Civil Cases (Toronto: Butterworths,
1974) at ix.
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be applicable. While the precise ambit of section 37 has never been deter-
mined," 7 it seems intended to operate to promote the dovetailing of federal
and provincial law. Secondly, the Federal Court of Canada has a discretion
when hearing matters to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence, if that evi-
dence would be admitted under provincial evidence law in a similar proceed-
ing in a superior court within a province. Lastly, by virtue of section 20 of
the Divorce Act,"8 divorce proceedings are to be conducted under provincial
evidence law, unless the Divorce Act or other federal legislation provides
otherwise.
The two reports preserve this general division in the scope of their appli-
cation. The Ontario Draft Act, while generally aimed at civil cases, would also
apply to administrative tribunals and to prosecutions for provincial offences.
While the federal Code would be used predominantly for criminal trials, it
would also apply to civil cases in the Federal Court, and partially to federal
hearings and inquiries. However, since the federal Code seeks to be pre-emp-
tive, it does not mar its logic by incorporating provincial law by such an ex-
pedient as section 37 of the Canada Evidence Act.
So different are the two reports that implementation would create new
and unnecessary distinctions between cases tried under federal or provincial
law. The legal profession was understandably concerned about the possibility
of having two different systems of evidence law, and the attendant confusion
that this would cause for judges and lawyers. While any legislative reform
requires a period of readjustment and relearning, no coherent case was made
out for such a potentially confusing fragmentation of the law." 9
In many respects it is important that there be a high degree of operating
compatability between federal and provincial law. In addition to the divorce
and Federal Court situations mentioned earlier, criminal law is an important
example. The same fact situation may constitute an offence under either the
Criminal Code or under a provincial statute. The practice of criminal law
would be immeasurably complicated if different rules of evidence applied
between Criminal Code offences and provincial offences. The demands of
formal equality in the administration of justice, and the practical concern for
efficiency would not be served by such a divergence. These concerns were
evident in the reactions to the federal Code that followed its publication.
The Minister of Justice, the Honourable Ron Basford, committed
the federal government shortly after publication to a programme of con-
sultation on evidence reform with the judiciary, the bar, crown attorneys and
senior government officials. -° A large number of meetings and seminars were
organized and chaired by Kenneth Chasse, formerly a Crown prosecutor,
117 See Ontario Report, supra, note 6, Chapter 17, which canvasses the jurispru-
dence. See also W. F. Bowker, The Law of Evidence, 1923-47 (1948), 26 Can. B. Rev.
246 at 247.
1 8 R.S.O. 1970, c. D-8.
119 For an argument along these lines, see J. R. Adams, Twin Codes of Evidence:
Just What the System Ordered (1975), 20 S. Dak. L.R. 228.120 Can. H. of C. Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, Proceedings,
No. 54 (May 25, 1976) at 6, 37-38.
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who acted as the Justice Department's opinion gatherer on evidence reform.
Reactions to the federal Code, interestingly enough, varied greatly from prov-
ince to province and between professional groups. The results of the opinions
garnered at these meetings could be summarized generally in three proposi-
tions: that existing law was unsatisfactory; that any reform should clarify and
simplify the present law; and that codification in the sense proposed by the
Law Reform Commission of Canada was distrusted as a concept. Although
seminar groups welcomed a number of the specific reforms in the federal
Report, they generally rejected the Draft Code.
The Ontario Report did not provoke the same degree of comment,
though particular recommendations such as those on marital privilege, pro-
fessional privilege and the oath were the subject of critical newspaper edi-
torials. The Ontario government was guarded in any public statements about
possible implementation.A1'
Shortly after the publication of the Ontario Report, a number of inter-
ested individuals began to express concern about the divergence of the
Ontario and Canada Reports, not merely from a disinterested academic
curiosity, but from a real anxiety that this divergence might be carried forward
into legislation to produce fragmented systems of evidence law. A new initia-
tive was required.
In early 1977, Dr. Richard Gosse, Q.C., the newly appointed Deputy At-
torney General for Saskatchewan, started to promote the idea of a special pro-
ject to draft uniform federal and provincial evidence legislation. Dr. Gosse was
uniquely qualified to act as a catalyst in this exercise. His career had included
two and a half years as Counsel to the Ontario Commission and a period as a
Consultant on Family Law Reform to the federal Commission; latterly he had
taught evidence to law students at the University of British Columbia. Dr.
Gosse produced a brief discussion paper for the federal-provincial Attorneys
General meeting held in Ottawa in June, 1977. At that meeting, it was decided
to refer the entire subject to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, an organ-
ization ideally suited, by function and history, to promote a uniform federal-
provincial Evidence Act.
At a Special Plenary Session of the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the
Uniform Law Conference held in the Casino of the Algonquin Hotel in
St. Andrews, New Brunswick, on August 25, 1977, decisive steps were finally
taken to plan the future development of Canadian evidence law. The St.
Andrews Resolution established an Evidence Task Force, reporting to the
Uniform Law Conference, and invited provincial jurisdictions to join Ontario
and Canada as participating members. 22 At the time of writing, British Col-
umbia, Nova Scotia, Alberta and Quebec have agreed to join the Task Force.
The Task Force will meet for two days a month under the chairmanship of
12 1 See statements of Hon. Roy McMurtry, Q.C. in Ont. Leg. Debates, June 16,
1976 at 3399, and F. W. Callaghan, Q.C. in Ont. Leg. Debates, Supply Committee,
October 28, 1976 at S-2413.
1= See remarks of Hon. Roy McMurtry, Q.C. in Ont. Leg. Debates, November
28, 1977 at 2320.
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Kenneth Chasse, the federal government's representative. Professor A. F.
Sheppard of the University of British Columbia has been asked to join the
Task Force as full-time research advisor.
The Task Force's primary mandate is to proceed to draft uniform evi-
dence legislation; the task is a difficult one, given the extent of its subject
matter and the time constraints under which it operates. It will be some
considerable time before one will be able to assess the success of the venture.
At the present time it offers a hope for a rational and national development
of evidence law, an almost unique example, regrettably, of federal-provincial
co-operation, and an illustration of the continuing vitality of the sixty year old
Uniform Law Conference of Canada. While it is impossible to know exactly
which direction the Task Force will take, it is probable that the overriding
concern for uniformity will steer it between the alternate futures of drastic
systemic change and limited local reform. The St. Andrew Resolution has in
effect made every assessment contained in this symposium interim and tentative.
VmI
As pointed out earlier, the Ontario and Canada Reports are a result of
very different exercises, informed by different views of the need for reform
and the effective limits of change. They contrast in substance, style and extent.
When both reports are compared, it becomes less easy to reject the federal
Report in its totality, as systemic change. For the Ontario Report above all
emphasizes that it is possible, even desirable, to take a pragmatic view of
evidence reform, effecting necessary reforms, revising discrete areas, discard-
ing obsolete doctrine, moving from each local area to another. In law, as in
medicine, plastic surgery is largely cosmetic and transplantation of funda-
mental parts is hazardous and unpredictable. Save where the entire body is
diseased, surgery is best local, precise, studied and careful. The Ontario
Report, by emphasizing that reform, albeit modest reform, is necessary and
overdue, prevented the more dramatic reforms of the federal Report from
being easily rejected.
The reception afforded to the two reports suggests certain conclusions
for law reformers. 2 3 First, that reformers should not over-estimate the benefits
of a radical simplification of legal rules. At a certain point, the Byzantine
niceties of misleading specificity are simply exchanged for the unknowable
exercise of judicial caprice in the name of equity, flexibility and discretion.
Wigmore drew back from the Model Code of Evidence on this point:
[A] Code, aiming as it does to serve as a practical guide in trials, must not be
content with abstractions, but must specifically deal with all the concrete rules,
123 Compare the statement of Mr. Justice Antonio Lamer:
The previous year, the Canadian Law Reform Commission had tabled a law on
evidence in code form, which was expressed in terms of principles and was pre-
emptive in character. It was probably unwise of them to have put forward their
proposals in this code form since many sensitive areas were involved. It was not
readily acceptable and the proposals would now probably have to be phased in
gradually. Therefore he agreed on the importance of not attempting unification,
codification and reform all at once.
Commonwealth Secretariat, Law Reform in the Commonwealth (1977 Meeting of Com-
monwealth Law Reform Agencies) at 37.
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exemplifying the application of an abstraction, that have been ruled upon or
enacted in a majority of jurisdictions; the Code specifically either repudiating or
affirming these rules.
If the objection be made that the law of Evidence should no longer remain a
network of petty detailed rules, the answer is, first, that both Bench and Bar need
concrete guidance in order that a normal routine be ordinarily followed for speedy
dispatch without discussion; secondly, that the Bar needs them in order to prepare
evidence for trial along normal expected lines; and thirdly, that the really effective
way to eliminate the present frequent over-emphasis on detailed concrete rules is
to provide that they shall be only guides, not chains - directory, not mandatory
- by forbidding the review of the Trial Court's application of them except in
extreme instances.124
Secondly, that although the constituency served by a law reform com-
mission must be the larger community of the general public, nevertheless
where reform will drastically affect the legal profession it is necessary to make
special efforts to convince them of the wisdom of the proposals. Wigmore
cautions reformers about the dangers of inflicting reforms upon a legal pro-
fession that is largely unsympathetic to, and unprepared for, the new prin-
ciples. The European move to a free weighing of proof [reien Beweiswurdi-
gung] in the early nineteenth century had resulted in a long period of uncer-
tainty: "judicial trials have been carried on for a century past.., by uncom-
prehended, unguided, and therefore unsafe mental processes.' m2  Reform, to
be effective, must rest on a firm scientific base, and gain the approval and un-
derstanding of those who must act within the new system of rules. To effect a
radical simplification of the law would be dangerous without the support of
the profession. Wiginore's own codification of the law of evidence, simpli-
fied and arranged on a rational basis, extends to 242 rules set out over
544 pages. 126
Lastly, we may need to rework our concepts of codification and reassess
the supposed benefits that are to flow from the introduction of a code.127 I do
not think that the ideal of codification should be abandoned, but we must
recognize that the ideal must be achieved gradually and patiently, and that
more urgent reforms will not wait for it.1 8
2 4 Wigmore, A Code of Evidence, supra, note 73 at xii; see also Wigmore, supra,
note 10, Vol. I, s. 8(c) at 262.
125 J. H. Wigmore, The Principles of Judicial Proof (2d ed. Boston: Little, Brown,
1931) at4.
126 Wigmore, supra, note 73. The attempt was described as "... a set of rules that
read like the Internal Revenue Code or the instructions for assembling mail-order
toys .... The quest for certainty in a set of hard-and-fast rules to govern the admis-
sibility of evidence is doomed to failure.'
K. W. Graham, California's "Restatement" of Evidence: Some Reflections on Appellate
Repair of the Codification Fiasco (1971), 4 Loyola U. L. Rev. 279 at 299.
127 Cross, Reform in the Law of Evidence (1961), 24 Mod. L. Rev. 32 at 61.
1 28 Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921), 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113 at 117:
Codification is, in the main, restatement. What we need, when we have gone
astray, is change. Codification is a slow and toilsome process, which, if hurried,
is destructive. What we need is some relief that will not wait upon the lagging
years .... Something less ambitious, in any event, is the requirement of the hour.
Legislation is needed, not to repress the forces through which judge-made law
develops, but to stimulate and free them.
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What does codification entail? In its most radical sense, codification
represents an attempt to remake the law in a logically and semantically pre-
cise pattern: the objective is to attain a comprehensive, exclusive (and indeed
pre-emptive) statement of the law, expressed in terms of underlying principles
and values, and organised in a logical structure. This contrasts markedly with
the generally held understanding of codification in the United States. For
example, the main objectives of the evidence codification currently being
undertaken by the New York Law Revision Commission are as follows:
1. to simplify and consolidate rules presently scattered throughout the State's
decisional and statutory law and restate them in the more easily accessible
form of a moderately sized, one-volume evidence manual;
2. to revise or eliminate rules which have become archaic and ill suited to the
conditions of present-day litigation, or have otherwise proven unsound; and
3. to promote speedy, inexpensive, and just determination of factual issues.'2 9
In this more limited sense, much useful work remains to be done toward
codification. We may choose to move towards a more comprehensive state-
ment of rules, but leave the doctrine of precedent intact. Indeed, it is quite
possible that the recommendations of the new Uniform Evidence Law Task
Force might be embodied in such a form. However more sweeping systemic
changes do seem to be out of the question at present.
Not that one doubts the need to develop and discuss ideas about such
systemic change. It may ultimately be argued that neither the Ontario nor the
Canada Report was sufficiently thorough-going in its review of the law, suffi-
ciently attentive to empirical examination of the practical operation of the
rules, or sufficiently radical in its recommendations. 1 0
For the most part, the Commissions centered their work on doctrinal
analysis, examining reported cases, academic writing, and the legislation, both
existing and proposed, of other jurisdictions. Very little empirical or system-
atic study of the operations of the rules of evidence in trial courts has been
carried out anywhere, and the methodological and practical difficulties of
undertaking such research would be considerable.' 3 ' In many areas, however,
one can doubt whether effective research is possible at all.'.
Further work along the lines suggested by the federal Report is neces-
sary, but I suspect that evidence reform will not be delayed on that count.
The practical orientation of reformers drawn from the ranks of the legal pro-
fession makes them impatient with criticism that suggests that remedial action
129 Report of the Law Revision Commission for New York for 1977 (1977, Leg.
Doc. No. 65) in McKinney's Session Law News of New York, May, 1977, at A-93.
180 For a harsh attack along these lines, see Graham, supra, note 126.
'
3 1 Valuable work has been done by Professor Anthony N. Doob: see Evidence
of Identity and Limiting Instructions (1973), 15 Crim. L.Q. 119; Psychology and Evi-
dence in M. L. Friedland, ed., Courts on Trial (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1975) at 40. Some Empirical Evidence on Judicial Interim Release Proceedings (1975),
17 Crim. L.Q. 258; Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canadian Evi-
dence Act Upon an Accused (1972), 15 Crim. L.Q. 88.
132 Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Working Paper on the Rule
Against Hearsay (1976) at 284.
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must await a truly comprehensive study of the day to day operation of the
trial: "And it may be doubted whether the suggested research is really neces-
sary to achieve the objective of having rules which can be understood and
applied with ease by the courts ... Faced with an absence of research, and
the present impossibility of achieving it, are we to defer any proposal for
reforming the law of evidence for a long time when less elaborate observa-
tions and the teachings of common sense show that substantial advantages
would follow at once from some reforms?"133
The focus of the reform may limit vision. Evidence is so inextricably
bound up with our processes of dispute resolution and with substantive rules
of law that it must be approached in the broadest way. Perhaps both these
reports will become part of a process of reform that achieves this objective,
that looks at evidentiary rules as part of a re-examination of the total method
of social dispute resolution, not as a limited and academic study. "If we are
to do justice to our concept of justice we soon must analyze the values and
mechanics of our entire dispute resolution system, bring together what we
now call procedure, evidence, judicial administration, and trial practice, and
place the proof system in its proper focus.' 3 4
To reform evidence law requires us to look beyond the present and to
go beyond the law of evidence. It will be a continuous, on-going process. Ac-
cording to Mill, Bentham "found the philosophy of judicial procedure, includ-
ing.., evidence, in a more wretched state than even any other part of the
philosophy of law."'8 5 However, when he describes Bentham's work in this
area as carrying" it at once almost to perfection; [he] left it with every one of
its principles established, and little remaining to be done even in the sugges-
tion of practical arrangements,"' 3 6 Mill freezes the necessary development of
tion of practical arrangements,"' 86 he freezes the necessary development of
the law. Such a formulation, while generous to Bentham, denies a future to
the law. The possible forms that the future may take has been the major con-
cern of this article, and, implicitly, of the articles that follow. This symposium
is a contribution to, as well as a preliminary assessment of, the future devel-
opment of Canadian evidence law. As such it is not merely about law reform,
it is part of it.
13 Id.
'34 Mill, Beyond the Law of Evidence (1967) 40 S. Calif. L.R. 1 at 37.
135 J. S. Mill, "Bentham," in Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J.M. Robson
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969) at 104.
136 Id.
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